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The Future of Punitive Damages After Browning-Ferris
Industries v. Kelco Disposal
I. INTRODUCTION
In Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelco Disposal,1 the United States Su-
preme Court upheld against an eighth amendment challenge a jury award of six
million dollars in punitive damages, despite the fact that the award was one
hundred twenty times larger than the compensatory damages awarded in the
case.' The Court's opinion, however, left open other questions concerning the
constitutionality of punitive damages.' The most notable of these open questions
is whether the vast discretion given to juries to award punitive damages violates
the due process clause." This term, the Court heard arguments on that issue, in
a case which could lead to a dramatic change in the use of punitive damages.5
Concern about the constitutionality of punitive damage awards is rooted in
the perception of both the legal community and the general public that such
awards are becoming excessive and counterproductive.6 The extremely high eco-
nomic and social costs of unusually disproportionate punitive damage awards
raise the issue of what limitations can and should be placed on jury awards of
this type. This Note argues that the answer lies in interjecting the protections of
the due process clause into the awarding of punitive damages, in order to curtail
the unbridled discretion currently held by the jury.
Part II of this Note will examine the recent Browning-Ferris decision in
some detail. It will explore the majority opinion's analytical and historical ap-
proach as well as highlighting the arguments of Justice O'Connor's dissent that
may provide a foundation for the necessary change in the punitive damages law.
Part III will discuss the underlying principles and theories of punitive damages
and present the social and economic impact of high jury awards. Part IV will
analyze a due process challenge to an award of punitive damages under the
"4void for vagueness" doctrine and propose a variety of devices to correct the
infirmities. In conclusion, this Note will briefly discuss the likelihood of success
of a due process challenge in the Supreme Court or at trial.
1. 109 S. Ct. 2909 (1988).
2. Id. For the amounts of the damages, see infra note 12 and accompanying text.
3. Id. at 2923 (Brennan, J., concurring).
4. Id. at 2924-25 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The other open questions include whether the eighth amend-
ment reaches actions in which the government prosecutes or has any right to share in the proceeds and whether a
qul tam action would implicate the eighth amendment. Id. at 2914, 2920.
5. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 553 So. 2d 537 (Ala. 1989), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 1780 (1990).
The Court heard oral arguments on October 3, 1990. 59 U.S.L.W. 3307 (Oct. 23, 1990.)
6. See Shechy, Lazare & Lindseth, Punitive Damages, Uncertainty and Regulating First Party Insurer Con-
duct, in BAD FArrH LITIGATION AND INSURER VS. INSURER DispurEs (PLI) 145, 148 (1988); Geller & Levy, The
Constitutlonality of Punitive Damages, 73 A.B.A. J., Dec. 1987, at 88. See also infra text accompanying notes
63-78.
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II. THE BROWNING-FERRIS DECISION
A. Facts of the Case
In an antitrust claim filed in Vermont, Browning-Ferris Industries (BFI)
was found in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act for engaging in preda-
tory price cutting and interference with Kelco Disposal, Inc.'s contractual rela-
tions.7 Joseph Kelley, a former employee of Browning-Ferris, had started a
competing waste disposal business, Kelco, and carved a niche into BFI's busi-
ness in Burlington.' BFI then aggressively sought to run Kelley out of business,
telling its sales force to "[s]quish him like a bug. '"
BFI was also found liable on a state law claim of interference with contrac-
tual relations.10 The jury was instructed to award punitive damages on the state
law claim if they found by clear and convincing evidence that BFI's conduct
"'revealed actual malice, outrageous conduct, or constituted a willful and wan-
ton or reckless disregard of the plaintiff's rights.' "", The jury found BFI liable
on both counts, awarding Kelco only $51,146 in compensatory damages on the
federal and state claims combined but $6,000,000 in punitive damages. 12 The
district court denied BFI's post-trial motions for remittitur, new trial, and judg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict, and awarded Kelco $153,438 in treble dam-
ages and $212,000 in attorney's fees under the antitrust claim, or in the alterna-
tive, $6,066,082.74 in compensatory and punitive damages on the state law
claim.' 3 The Second Circuit affirmed the decision on both liability and dam-
ages. 4 The Supreme Court granted certiorari based on the punitive damages
issue.'5
B. The Supreme Court Decision
The Court, by a seven to two majority, affirmed the lower court's decision.
Justice Blackmun authored the majority opinion, which held that the eighth
amendment's prohibition on excessive fines did not apply to awards of punitive
damages in a civil case.' 6 The majority did not reach the issue of whether such
7. Browning-Ferris, 109 S. Ct. at 2913.
8. id. at 2912-13.
9. Id. The shocking language revealed by BFI's internal memoranda makes it easier to understand the harsh
reaction of the jury. In addition to the aforementioned quotation, BFI's sales force was instructed to "'[d]o
whatever it takes'. . . to put Kelco out of business and told if 'it meant give the stuff away, give it away."' Id. at
2912. However understandable the jury reaction may be, it also dramatically demonstrates the risks of such
unfettered discretion. See infra notes 116-28 and accompanying text.
10. Id.
11. Id. No punitive damages were awarded on the federal claim. The Sherman Act provides that the victori-
ous plaintiff "shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable
attorney's fee." 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1987). This is one approach to limiting excessive punitive damage awards. See
infra notes 143-45 and accompanying text.
12. Browning-Ferris, 109 S. Ct. at 2913.
13. Id. This alternative was due to the limitations of the Sher man Act on damage awards. See supra note
11.
14. Kelco Disposal, Inc. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 845 F,2d 404, 411 (2d Cir. 1988).
15. Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 488 U.S. 980 (1988).
16. Browning-Ferris, 109 S. Ct. at 2914.
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an award violated the due process clause, as the issue was not properly pre-
served on appeal. 17 Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, filed a concur-
ring opinion, specifically leaving open the due process issue.18 Justice O'Connor,
joined by Justice Stevens, filed a dissent arguing that the award did violate the
eighth amendment.' 9 O'Connor's dissent also expressly left open the due process
issue."
1. The Majority Opinion
Justice Blackmun began his analysis with an examination of the historical
purposes of the eighth amendment. The amendment's primary purpose was to
place limits upon the prosecutorial power of the government." The amendment
reads, "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."22 For the purposes of this case, Jus-
tice Blackmun focused on the excessive fines clause. The clause was a result of
the abuse of the thirteenth-century practice of amercements, "payable to the
crown after a legal action,"23 and has its origins in the Magna Carta.24 The
amercements clause of the Magna Carta prohibited payments to the crown
which were not proportionate to the wrong, or were so high as to deprive the
party of his livelihood. 5 In Browning-Ferris, the petitioners argued that large
punitive damage awards were the functional equivalent of amercements.2 6
When viewed in the context of the social and economic costs that such awards
exact,27 these payments violate the Magna Carta antecedents of the eighth
amendment, and thus should be stricken.28
The majority, opting for a formalistic rather than a more pragmatic ap-
proach, rejected this argument.29 Justice Blackmun, noting that both the eighth
17. Id. at 2921 n.23. Failure to properly preserve this issue is a recurring problem in punitive damage ap-
peals, and poses a substantial barrier to a judicial resolution of the due process issue. See infra note 98 and
accompanying text.
18. Id. at 2923. Justice Brennan's language strongly suggests that the Court would be receptive to the argu-
ment proposed by this Note. "I for one would look longer and harder at an award of punitive damages based on
such skeletal guidance than I would at one situated with a range of penalties as to which responsible officials had
deliberated and then agreed." Id. See infra Part IV for a discussion of due process issues.
19. Browning-Ferris, 109 S. Ct. at 2924.
20. Id. Justice O'Connor was the first member of the Court to recognize the constitutional infirmities of the
present system. See Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 86 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Justice Scalia joined in that opinion, and at oral argument seemed quite interested in the due process issue. See
Jeffries & Freeman, Constitutional Issues In Punitive Damages Litigation: an Agenda for Defense Counsel, FOR
TE DE., Jan., 1989, at 9, 15.
21. Id. at 2915. See also Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250 (1833); Weems v. United
States, 217 U.S. 349, 371-72 (1910).
22. US. CONsT., amend. VIII.
23. Browning-Ferris, 109 S. Ct. at 2917 n.13.
24. Id. at 2917-18.
25. Id. at 2918.
26. Id. This view also has found substantial academic support. See Massey, The Excessive Fines Clause and
Punitive Damages: Some Lessons from History, 40 VAID. L Rav. 1233, 1259-61 (1987); Note, The Constitu-
tionality of Punitive Damages Under the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment, 85 MICH. L. Rav.
1699, 1714-19 (1987).
27. See infra text accompanying notes 72-98.
28. Browning-Ferris, 109 S. Ct. at 2918 n.17.
29. Id. at 2918-19.
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amendment and the Magna Carta were controls on the prosecutorial power of
the government, refused to extend eighth amendment protections to civil cases,
saying "[t]hese concerns are clearly inapposite in a case where a private party
receives exemplary damages from another party, and the government has no
share in the recovery."30 The Court left open, however, the question of whether
the eighth amendment would therefore apply to an action in which the state
was litigating a civil matter or a qui tam action.3 1 The Court also declined to
reach the due process issue because the matter had not been properly preserved
on appeal.32
Three major criticisms of the majority opinion exist. First, while acknowl-
edging that "[t]he [a]mendment must draw its meaning from the evolving stan-
dards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society,"' 3 the Court
spends virtually the entire opinion discussing the historical antecedents of puni-
tive damages as justification for their modern stand. This flows directly into the
next criticism, which is that the Court ignores the social and economic impact
of such disproportionately large punitive awards. If it is true that "[t]ime works
changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes" and "a principle to
be vital must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it
birth,' 3 4 then it seems foolish to ignore the modern impact of such awards and
decide the case solely on historical antecedents. Finally, as Justice 0' Connor's
dissent ably demonstrates, the historical analysis, standing alone, could be used
to support an application of the eighth amendment to the law of punitive dam-
ages. Accordingly, the reasoning of the majority opinion is insufficient, particu-
larly in light of the impact of the law on modern society.3 5
2. Justice O'Connor's Dissent
In contrast to the majority, Justice, O'Connor acknowledges that awards of
punitive damages have grown rapidly in the past few years, with unfortunate
social and economic consequences.
Awards of punitive damages are skyrocketing. As recently as a decade ago, the largest
award of punitive damages affirmed by an appellate court in a products liability case
30. Id.
31. Id. at 2914. See also id. at 2920 n.21, where the Court discusses United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435
(1989). In Halper, the Court held that the double jeopardy clause applied to civil actions brought by the federal
government after the defendant had been punished through the criminal process. The Court noted that this was
not applicable to private parties. Id. at 1903. This distinction, which also is used in Browning-Ferris, seems incon-
gruous. If punitive damages serve the purpose of punishment, then the damage to the rights of the defendant are
jeopardized no matter who brings the suit. Nevertheless, the Court maintains this distinction, providing a substan-
tial ideological barrier to a due process challenge. See infra notes 99-107 and accompanying text.
32. Browning-Ferris, 109 S. Ct. at 2921. See also note 17 and accompanying text. The failure of defendants
to properly preserve this issue for appeal has been a major impediment to the development of the due process
challenge. See infra note 98 and accompanying text.
33. Id. at 2914 n.4 (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
34. Id. at 2919 (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910)). Indeed, the Court in Weems
continued, "[i]n the application of a constitution. . . our contemplation cannot be only of what has been but of
what may be." Weems, 217 U.S. at 373. By ignoring the social and economic costs of excessive jury awards of
punitive damages (see infra notes 72-93 and accompanying text) and clinging to historical arguments, the Court
adopts the same short-sighted approach which their own precedent condemns.
35. See infra notes 72-93 and accompanying text.
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was $250,000. . . Since then, awards more than 30 times as high have been sus-
tained on appeal.. . . The threat of such enormous awards has a detrimental effect on
the research and development of new products. 56
Noting that punitive damages serve the same two purposes as criminal laws,
punishment and deterrence, Justice O'Connor engages in her own examination
of the history of the eighth amendment. She finds that the amendment applies
to civil awards of punitive damages.3 7 Her analysis discusses English precedent
for invading the province of the jury in order to prevent excessive awards that
endanger the liberty of those against whom they are levied.38 "I should not al-
low the respect which is traditionally paid to an assessment of damages by a
jury to prevent me from seeing that the weapon is used without restraint.13 9
Ultimately, Justice O'Connor advocates use of the proportionality framework of
Solem v. Helm4 0 to determine whether a particular award is excessive.41 Solem
established that the constitutionality of punishment should be measured against
"objective criteria, including (i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of
the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdic-
tion; and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other
jurisdictions.""2 Applied to punitive damages, the Solem framework provides at
least some guidance in determining the relative fairness of a jury award. 43
Justice 0' Connor's dissent is significant in several respects. Foremost is
her recognition of the growing problem of excessive jury awards in punitive
damage cases.44 Second, Justice O'Connor recognizes that such awards are
often the result of the unbridled discretion accorded juries in these matters.45
Finally, the proposal to adapt the Solem framework demonstrates the unique
interrelationship between the civil and criminal aspects of punitive damages.
This represents a critical step toward abandonment of the majority's formalistic
approach in favor of a more pragmatic method that avoids the significant social
harms of disproportionate awards. 46
36. Browning-Ferris, 109 S. Ct. at 2924. (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). The pattern of high
punitive damage awards is continuing today. See, e.g. Davis v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 906
F.2d 1206 (8th Cir. 1990) (upholding a jury award of punitive damages 20 times greater than the amount
awarded as compensatory damages).
37. Browning-Ferris, 109 S. Ct. at 2924-34. Justice 0' Connor's analysis ably demonstrates the insufficien-
cies of the majority approach, and the need to take into account the impact of excessive awards on modem
defendants in order to adequately evaluate the constitutional claims.
38. Id. at 2926-30.
39. Id. at 2930 (citing Rookes v. Barnard [19641 A.C. 1129, 1227). Compare this approach with the actual
action of the Court, id. at 2923 n.26 (expressing reluctance to interfere with the jury because of traditional
common law standards).
40, 463 U.S. 277 (1982).
41. Id. at 290-92.
42. Id. at 292.
43. Brownlng-Ferris, 109 S. Ct. at 2933-34.
44. Id. at 2924. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See also infra Part III.D.
45. Id. at 2932.
46. See infra notes 74-93 and accompanying text.
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III. THE LAW OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES: UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES AND
IMPACT
A. History
As noted above, the practice of awarding punitive damages predates the
Magna Carta.47 Control of these awards was allocated to the jury as early as
the thirteenth century.4 Because the jury had little guidance as to what consti-
tuted an appropriate measure of damages, jury awards "ranged from the ridicu-
lously excessive to the grossly inadequate. '49 The basic principle of these
awards was to provide the plaintiff with a sum greater than his injury required,
to punish the defendant.50 Throughout American history, controversy over the
propriety of punitive damages has raged, with periods of favor and disfavor over
the last 225 years."" England virtually abolished the practice of awarding puni-
tive damages in civil cases in 1963, 51 leading many American scholars to call
for their abolition here as well.53
B. Rationale for Punitive Damage Awards
Although the purposes advanced for punitive damage awards vary from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction and statute to statute, three justifications are com-
mon: retribution, compensation, and punishment/deterrence.
The first, retribution, seems incompatible with our modern conception of
the judicial system.5 4 It is, nonetheless, a long-standing rationale for both puni-
tive damages and the law in general. As Justice Holmes has noted, "[i]f people
would gratify the passion of revenge outside of the law, if the law did not help
them, the law has no choice but to satisfy the craving itself, and thus avoid the
greater evil of private retribution." 55 If these words remain true today, then it is
certainly disturbing that the instrument of this retribution, the jury, has so little
guidance in exacting its revenge. The specter of unguided retribution makes a
compelling argument for greater jury supervision in punitive damage cases.
Three states, Connecticut, Georgia, and Michigan, consider punitive dam-
ages to be another element of compensation .5 The Michigan law is illustrative.
47. See supra text accompanying notes 23-24.
48. Belli, Punitive Damages: Their History, Their Use, and Their Worth in Present Day Society, 49 UMKC
L. REv. 1, 3 (1980).
49. Id. at 3.
50. K. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 7.4 (1980).
51. Belli, supra note 48, at 4 ("Punitive damages have had a checkered history of favor-disfavor in English
jurisprudence, just as they have had in American jurisprudence."). See also K. REDDEN, supra note 50, at §
7.5(D) (showing cases over 100 years ago criticizing the doctrine), but see Belli, supra note 48, at 5 ("punitive
damages now are permitted almost uniformly").
52. Belli, supra note 48, at 4.
53. See K. REDDEN, supra note 50, at § 7.5(B). See also Sales & Coles, Punitive Damages: A Relic That
Has Outlived Its Origins, 37 VAND. L. REv. 1117 (1984).
54. Belli, supra note 48, at 5.
55. O.W. HOLMES, THE ComoN LAW 4 (1881).
56. See generally 1 J. GIUARDI & J. KIRCHER, PUNITIVE DAmAoEs: LAW AND PRAICrcE 9 4.02-4.06 (1985)
(summarizing the individual approaches of these states). See also No Punitive Damages in Michigan, FOR TmE
DEF., Jan. 1989, at 31.
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As the Michigan Supreme Court explains its policy, "the purpose of exemplary
damages has not been to punish the defendant but to render the plaintiff whole
by compensating for mental injury in a limited class of cases where such mental
injury is the result of outrageous conduct.""1 While this approach is unique, and
avoids the criminal overtones that exist in the punitive damage award system in
the majority of states, it seems intuitively incorrect. If the damages are compen-
satory, then they should be proven by the plaintiff, and not left to the unfettered
discretion of the jury.
The third rationale for punitive damages is the most frequently cited and
most logical: to punish the defendant in order to deter him, and others like him,
from repeating the offensive conduct.58 Because of its logical and semantic ap-
peal, this approach was adopted by the Restatement (Second) of Torts:
"[p]unitive damages are damages, other than compensatory or nominal dam-
ages, awarded against a person to punish him for his outrageous conduct and to
deter him and others like him from similar conduct in the future." 59 This
method allows the courts to enforce social mores, a time-honored function of the
judicial system.60 The difficulty with this rationale, however, is that punishment
is generally the domain of criminal law." "Punitive damage awards corrupt the
distinction between the civil and criminal law while permitting a lesser burden
of proof for imposing the penalties."6 This argument is one of the cornerstones
of constitutional attacks on punitive damages.6"
C. Modern Developments
Punitive damage awards were relatively benign until the late 1960s and the
landmark case of Roginsky v. Richardson-Merell, Inc.64 In Roginsky, Judge
Friendly correctly forecast the current dilemma:
The legal difficulties engendered by claims for punitive damages on the part of hun-
dreds of plaintiffs are staggering. If all recovered punitive damages in the amount here
awarded these would run into tens of millions, as contrasted with the maximum crimi-
nal penalty.. . . We have the gravest difficulty in perceiving how claims for punitive
damages in such a multiplicity of actions throughout the nation can be so administered
as to avoid overkill.65
Judge Friendly's words proved prophetic: mass tort claims, coupled with claims
for punitive damages, skyrocketed throughout the 1970s."6 In addition to an
increased number of punitive damage awards, the amount of the awards also
57. Gilroy v. Conway, 151 Mich. App. 628, 636, 391 N.W.2d 419, 422 (1986).
58. Belli, supra note 48, at 6. See also K REDDEN, supra note 50, at § 7.5(B)(2) (Supp. 1987); Jeffries &
Freeman, supra note 20, at 10.
59. REsTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTs § 908(1) (1977).
60. See J. GMARDI & J. KIRCHER, supra note 56, at 2.02 (comparing functions of punitive damages to
criminal concepts).
61. K. REDDEN, supra note 50, at § 7.5 (Supp. 1987).
62 Id.
63. Jeffries & Freeman, supra note 20, at 10-12.
64. 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967).
65. Id. at 839.
66. See Jeffries, A Comment on the Constitutionality of Punitive Damages, 72 VA. L. REv. 139, 142-45
(1986). Compare Owen, Punitive Damages In Products Liability Litigation, 74 Mtcm L. REv. 1258 (1976) with
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escalated rapidly.67 The dramatic growth of punitive damage awards led Profes-
sor David Owen, originally a leading advocate of the use of punitive damages as
a check on corporate abuses against the general public, to reconsider his posi-
tion: "the experience of the past several years has raised questions whether the
punitive damages doctrine is being abused in products cases, whether some
manufacturers are being punished who should not be, and whether penalties,
though appropriately assessed, are sometimes unfairly large."68
Neither the trend of increasing awards nor the discomfort with that trend
in the legal community appears to be easing at all.69 Furthermore, the courts
have handled numerous challenges since the June 1989 Browning-Ferris deci-
sion without settling the matter.70 Martin Connor, President of the American
Tort Reform Association, succinctly described the mood of the legal commu-
nity, including state legislators, when he said, "the system is broke and needs
fixing."721
D. Social and Economic Impact of Punitive Damages
The fundamental premise of this Note is that the detrimental impact of
excessive punitive damage awards warrants a solution of constitutional propor-
tions. Many persons in the field remain unconvinced, claiming that large puni-
tive awards are the exception and not the rule.7 2 Fortunately, this view is begin-
ning to give way to the more realistic view espoused by one corporate general
counsel, that "[c]ourts are beginning to understand that there is no free
Owen, Problems in Assessing Punitive Damages Against Manufacturers of Defective Products, 49 U. Cim. L
REv. 1 (1982).
67. Jeffries, supra note 66, at 145 n.23. More recent cases have continued that trend. See, e.g., Bankers Life
& Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw, 483 So. 2d 254 (Miss. 1985), afd, 486 U.S. 71 (1988); Lake Placid Holding Co. v.
Paparone, 508 So. 2d 372 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987); Alfa Mut. Ins. Co. v. Northington, 561 So. 2d 1041 (Ala.
1990).
68. Jeffries, supra note 66, at 144. See also supra note 66 (comparing articles that contain both positions of
Professor Owen).
69. See, e.g., Villella v. Waikem Motors, Inc., 45 Ohio St. 3d. 36, 543 N.E.2d 464 (1989); Fed. Deposit Ins.
Corp. v. W.R. Grace Co. 691 F. Supp. 87 (N.D. Ill. 1988), rev'd in part, 877 F.2d 614 (7th Cir. 1988) (district
court ordered remittitur of 75 million dollar punitive damage award; entire punitive damage award overturned on
appeal); Eichenseer v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 881 F.2d 1355 (5th Cir. 1989) (while upholding $500,000 punitive
damage award on $10,000 compensatory damage award, court noted "[b]ecause of the harsh consequences which
might ensue from such action, courts should not lightly seek to limit the imposition of punitive damages without
due thought and consideration). In Eichenseer, the court utilized a due process analysis in upholding the award
but declined to rule on the actual constitutionality of such awards. 881 F.2d at 1365-68. See also Geller & Levy,
supra note 6, at 90.
70. See. e.g., Simpson v. Pittsburgh Coming Corp., 901 F.2d 277 (2d Cir. 1990); Johnson v. Celotex Corp.,
899 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1990); Juzmin v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 705 F. Supp. 1053 (D.N.J. 1989), vacated, 718
F. Supp. 1233 (D.N.J. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 900 F.2d 686 (3d Cir. 1990); Eichenseer v. Reserve Life
Ins. Co., 881 F.2d. 1355 (5th Cir. 1989); Western Fireproofing Co. v. W.R. Grace, No. 88-2396, slip op. (8th Cir.
July 31, 1989), vacated, 896 F.2d 286 (8th Cir. 1990); Robertson Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 871 F.2d
1368 (8th Cir. 1989). But see Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 553 So. 2d 537 (Ala. 1989), cert. granted, 110
S. Ct. 1780 (1990).
71. Punitives in Peril, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1989, at 46.
72. Id. This appears to be a minority view. See Jeffries, supra note 66, at 143, nn.14-15.
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lunch-that punitives have an impact on society, on innovation and on what
products are marketed."7 3
The specter of large punitive damage awards hangs over every corporate
decision in America today.74 As large verdicts are affirmed,7 5 more suits allege
punitive damages in the hope of obtaining a larger award or a larger settle-
ment.7 8 Discovery in a suit demanding punitive damages can become more ex-
pansive than in mere compensatory tort actions, increasing the costs of litiga-
tion.7 7 These costs create a more difficult choice for defendants who must
"choose between the Scylla of economically devastating discovery costs that can
transform a favorable verdict into a pyrrhic economic victory and the Charybdis
of outrageous and unwarranted monetary settlements. 17 a
The immediate impact of this situation is the soaring cost or absolute un-
availability of insurance for companies in "high-risk" industries.79 These "high-
risk" fields include the food, automotive, aviation, pharmaceutical, and media
industries.8 0 The burden is especially difficult on smaller companies which, una-
ble to locate affordable insurance, must choose between abandoning new prod-
ucts or risk bankruptcy by the decision of a civil jury."'
In the end, of course, it is the consumer who must bear this cost. "Econom-
ically, the long term effect of these trends may be concentration of manufactur-
ing and professional services; most likely resulting in less competition and
higher prices."8 The situation in professional services, especially physicians, is
equally disturbing.
Obstetricians appear to be particularly affected by malpractice suits and rising insur-
ance premiums. According to a survey by the American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists, record numbers of obstetricians are abandoning the practice. Experts
say this trend, together with increasing insurance premiums, means higher fees and
fewer options for one's choice of a physician. Not only are more obstetricians aban-
73. Gross, Punitive Damages in the Products Liability Setting, in PREPARATIoN AND TRUAL OF A Toxic
TORT CASE (PLA) 511, 514 (1988) ("The threat of overpunishment and possible bankruptcy to a corporate de-
fendant involved in a mass tort situation is perhaps the most litigated and controversial issue in the punitive
damages/products liability area today"); Geller & Levy, supra note 6, at 90; Jeffries, supra note 66, at 143 nn.14-
15.
74. Bell, Reverse Synergisms: Unprecedented Results From Traditional Legal Means, 23 Hous. L. Rsv.
849, 852 (1986). See also Sales & Coles, supra note 53, at 1154-57; Gross, supra note 73, at 514.
75. Sales & Coles, supra note 53, at 1156.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1157. This is true because the plaintiff must now not only investigate the actual causation of the
injury, but also the malice aspect, as well as detailed financial information to attempt to determine a suitable
dollar amount for punitive damages.
78. Id. Scylla and Charybdis were twin dangers to seamen in Greek mythology.
79. Comment, Punitive Damages: The Burden of Proof Required by Procedural Due Process, 22 U.S.F. L.
REv. 99, 109-11 (1988).
80. Id. at 104. The cases in these areas are among the most prominent in the field, both to legal scholars and
lay observers. See generally Ford Motor Co. v. Durrill, 714 S.W.2d 329 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986), vacated, 754
S.W.2d 646 (Tex. 1988) (automotive); In re Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974, 427 F. Supp. 701 (C.D. Cal.
1977), rev'd, 622 F.2d 1315 (9th Cir. 1980) (aviation); Roginsky v. Richardson-Merell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832 (2d
Cir. 1967) (pharmaceutical).
81. Comment, supra note 79, at 104. See also Business Struggling To Adapt As Insurance Crisis Spreads,
Wall St. J., Jan. 21, 1986, at 33, col. 1.
82. Comment, supra note 79, at 111.
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doning the field, but more doctors in general are shunning private practice or leaving
practice altogether. 11
Neither are lawyers immune from this threat, as evidenced by their soaring
malpractice premiums," Architects, accountants, and corporate of-
ficers-indeed any person who makes professional judgments-face a similar
crisis.8 5
The social impact of excessive punitive damage awards extends beyond the
higher costs and limited choices available to consumers. Vast amounts of social
resources are also wasted.88 This is a society which is "claim-oriented, litigious
. .. [and] will become more so."" Allowing awards that lack a principled basis
only makes suits with excessive punitive damage claims more attractive.8 8 This
contributes to the burden on our already overtaxed system, and may actually
serve to undermine the legitimate purposes and benefits of punitive damages.8 9
Still another problem for business lies in the uncertainty of a punitive dam-
age award. Without a standard fixing the award of punitive damages, unlike
criminal fines or compensatory damages, defendants against such claims have
no way of knowing what their potential punishment will be.8 0 This uncertainty
makes it extremely difficult for business to assess the merits of a given enter-
prise, particularly in the area of new product development.9 1 Some consumer
activists argue that this is beneficial, preventing manufacturers from factoring
in the cost of socially undesirable behavior.9 2 Nevertheless, certainty in business
planning is an accepted goal of the law, as evidenced by the adoption of the
Uniform Commercial Code. 8 Furthermore, given that the detrimental costs of
punitive damage awards are ultimately passed along to consumers, it is debata-
ble whether the uncertainty created by uncontrolled punitive damage awards
actually furthers its purported policy goals.
The bottom line is that something needs to be done to curtail the growth of
punitive damage awards and their deleterious economic and social costs. Al-
though the Supreme Court has consistently avoided the issue, 4 the constitution-
83. Id. at 107 (footnotes omitted). See also MDs Won't Deliver, A.B.A. J., July 1986, at 20 (35% of the
2600 physicians responding to a survey indicated they were giving up their OB/GYN practice due to the difficulty
in obtaining insurance).
84. Comment, supra note 79, at 106-07. See also Lynch, The Insurance Panic for Lawyers, A.B.A. J., July
1986, at 42.
85. Comment, supra note 79, at 107-08. See also Costly Crash 1, 6 Bus. L. Rav. 106 (1985).
86. Bell, supra note 74, at 853.
87. Id. at 855.
88. See supra notes 74-76.
89. Bell, supra note 74, at 853. See also Sales & Coles, supra note 53, at 1158 n.183 (quoting editorial of
The Houston Post: "It seems no one these days is willing to take responsibility for his own actions. It's always
someone else's fault. However, it doesn't take too much imagination to figure out why GM was sued instead of the
driver: GM is richer.").
90. Comment, supra note 79, at 114.
91. See generally Comment, supra note 79; Sales & Coles, supra note 53.
92. Punitives in Peril, supra note 71.
93. Llewellyn, Why a Commercial Code, 22 TENN. L Rav. 779, 780-83 (1953).
94. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813 (1986); Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71
(1988); Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 2909 (1989). But see Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co.
v. Haslip, 553 So. 2d 537 (Ala. 1989), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 1780 (1990).
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ality of these awards has been considered fairly settled.9 5 Nevertheless, the im-
portant policy implications discussed above demand that the Court examine
how excessive punitive damage awards affect the due process issue. Juries are
essentially allowed carte blanche with this extremely potent weapon. Because
punitive damage awards are so clearly within the province of the jury, courts
are reluctant to set aside jury awards as excessive. This practice raises serious
questions of due process.96
The problem is, however, that the Court does not appear receptive to the
due process argument. Again last term, the Court denied certiorari to three
cases posing this issue.9 7 As was the case in Browning-Ferris, due process claims
are often not properly preserved.98 Where a due process claim has been pre-
served, an argument presented in the analytical framework established by the
Court in earlier due process cases is likely to demonstrate that the award of
disproportionately high punitive damages has serious constitutional infirmities.
Part IV outlines an approach based on the vagueness doctrine.
IV. A DUE PROCESS CHALLENGE BASED ON THE VAGUENESS DOCTRINE
The first step in formulating a due process challenge is to determine that
the fourteenth amendment applies to punitive damage awards. To make such a
finding, it becomes absolutely critical to characterize punitive damages by their
true nature, that is, that punitive damages are a form of punishment.99
As discussed earlier, such awards cannot truly be considered compensa-
tory;100 rather, they serve the purposes of retribution and deterrence.101 The Su-
preme Court has made it quite clear that "[r]etribution and deterrence are not
legitimate nonpunitive governmental objectives."11°2 This finding by the Court
has the effect of making punitive damages a quasi-criminal concept, and war-
rants the accordance of constitutional protections against unconstrained punish-
ment by the state to those facing punitive damage awards in a civil
proceeding.103
Constitutional protections arise when punitive damages are viewed as a
criminal concept. " This formulation should not be considered overreaching, be-
cause due process is an abstract concept not limited to any rigid compart-
mentalization. 10 5 In essence, this approach locates the appropriate state action
95. Wheeler, The Constitutional Case for Reforming Punitive Damage Procedures, 69 VA. L. REv. 269
(1983); see also Jeffries, supra note 66, at 140.
96. Jeffries & Freeman, supra note 20, at 10. See also Browning-Ferris, 109 S. Ct. at 2933-34.
97. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. But see Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 553 So. 2d 537
(Ala. 1989), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 1780 (1990).
98. Jeffries & Freeman, supra note 20, at 19.
99. J. GHIARDi & J. KIRCHER, supra note 56, at I 2.02, 4.13-4.16; Jeffries & Freeman, supra note 20, at
10.
100. See supra text accompanying notes 54-55.
101. Jeffries & Freeman, supra note 20, at 10.
102. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 n.20 (1979).
103. Jeffries & Freeman, supra note 20, at 10.
104. Wheeler, supra note 95, at 286; Jeffries & Freeman, supra note 20, at 10.
105. Comment, supra note 79, at 121. See also Jeffries & Freeman, supra note 20, at 16.
1990]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
necessary for constitutional analysis.106 Furthermore, valuable private interests,
such as the property at risk of loss to a punitive damages award, are clearly at
stake.10 7 These factors combine to warrant the protection from unrestrained
governmental action afforded by the due process clause.
Having justified due process protections, the next step is to apply the
Court's due process test. As established in Mathews v. Eldridge,°08 this test,
also known as the "fundamental fairness" test, has three elements which the
Court will balance to determine if due process is satisfied: (1) the private inter-
ests at stake; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation under the current procedures
and the probable reduction of error with new procedures; and, (3) the govern-
ment's interest in minimizing the procedures. 10 An analysis of these elements
reveals that the current state of punitive damage awards, with their vague stan-
dards, boundless jury discretion, and limited appellate review contains serious
constitutional problems.
The first question under a Mathews v. Eldridge analysis is whether any
private interests are at stake. Clearly, significant property interests are involved
in a multi-million dollar lawsuit. Many businesses are forced to dissolve or seek
sanctuary in the bankruptcy court after a large jury award has been returned
against them." 0 In fact, it also can be argued that this restraint on action, as
well as the restraint on new product development in fear of large awards, in-
fringes on a protectible liberty interest as well."' Additionally, the damage to a
defendant's reputation, which can be caused by the mere allegation of impropri-
eties that might result in a quasi-criminal sanction of punitive damages, includ-
ing decreased sales, potential loss of credit, and a stigma of improper behavior
long after the conclusion of a lawsuit, constitutes a protected liberty interest."2
This brief listing, by no means exhaustive, demonstrates clearly that many pri-
vate interests are at stake in a punitive damages case, and that these interests
run deeper than the mere depletion of corporate cash reservoirs."'
The second prong of the "fundamental fairness" test is the risk of error
under the current procedures. It is in this area that the vagueness of jury in-
structions poses the most substantial problem with punitive damage awards.
Currently, juries are instructed to award punitive damages when a certain level
106. For a general discussion of the concept of state action, see J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG,
CONS TUTMONAL LAW 421-50 (3d ed. 1986).
107. Comment, supra note 79, at 124-34.
108. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
109. Id. at 335. See also Comment, supra note 79, at 121.
110. The difficulties encountered by A.H. Robins Co. (Dalkon Shield), Johns-Manville (asbestos) and Texaco
have been well documented. Comment, supra note 79, at 109 n.51 and the sources cited therein.
I11. Id. at 127-3 1. As the author points out, the specter and stigma of large punitive damage awards can
cause difficulties in obtaining credit, maintaining goodwill, or cultivating sales. The subsequent cash difficulties
can prevent a company from being able to take action, and freedom of action is something which is protected by
this type of analysis. Id.
112. See, e.g., In re Paris Air Crash, 622 F.2d 1315, 1322 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.. 976 (1980)
(describing punitive damages as an expression of "social condemnation"). In fact, this may be the most important
interest to be protected, for enforcing the stigma of criminal punishment without due process of law strikes at the
very heart of these protections. See Comment, supra note 79, at 124-27.
113. See Comment, supra note 79, at 127. Not to be forgotten in this analysis are the high social costs of
such large punitive damage awards. See supra notes 72-98 and accompanying text.
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of malice is found in a civil case."1" Unfortunately, the courts have been unable
to define with any precision what that level is.1 15 This vagueness and uncer-
tainty has a number of unfortunate and severe consequences:
First, the vague definition means that the jury has only the vaguest idea of the stan-
dards it is being asked to apply. The inexact terminology inevitably produces inconsis-
tency and inequality. It also leads to punitive sanctions being imposed upon individuals
for [reasons] that are clearly improper, such as popularity of the plaintiff or defend-
ant, the sympathy for one party or the other, or any of the commonly known
prejudices. It is difficult enough to eliminate such factors from the adjudicatory pro-
cess in cases in which punishment is not an issue. To permit a jury to impose punish-
ment upon an individual without giving that jury concrete or comprehensible guide-
lines upon which to base its judgment simply invites abuse. l6,
Furthermore, these errors are compounded by the deference accorded to jury
findings. This means that many jury awards, even though they were calculated
without any reasonable guidelines, are not overturned on appeal. 117
This lack of supervision leaves the entire system vulnerable to bias. With-
out any other standards to consult, jury members will quite naturally turn to
their own beliefs and prejudices. 1 ' Juries most often will award higher damages
against wealthy corporate defendants, who are perceived as "stuffed-shirts" and
persons who exploit workers and consumers for their own profit. 19 If evidence
of the defendant's wealth is introduced, the jury is more likely to award higher
punitive damages against this "deep-pocket."' 2 0 This sort of cultural or class
bias, often referred to as the "Robin Hood" syndrome, is inherently unfair, yet
the current vague standards do little to assist in its elimination.' 2 ' Class bias
can also run the other way. As the Court noted in Santosky v. Kramer, juries
may fail to award sufficient damages in cases for recovery based on permanent
neglect because the defendant is poor, uneducated, and non-white. 2 2 In either
situation, however, such bias is contrary to our traditional notions of fairness in
the court system.
The question that naturally follows from this analysis, and is required by
the "fundamental fairness" test, is whether or not more detailed procedures
would decrease the risk of error. It seems clear that more definitive standards
would, in fact, alleviate most of the problems enumerated above. By providing
the jury with more precise instructions, the court would assist the jury in dis-
114. Leitner, Punitive Damages: A Constitutional Assessment, 38 FED'N INS. & CoRp. CoUNs. Q. 119, 128
(1988). See, e.g., Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions-Civil (IPI) 35.01 (1990) ("willful and wanton conduct"); Cali-
fornia BAli 14.71 (West 7th ed. 1986 & Supp. 1990) (allowing award of punitive damages for oppression, fraud,
or actual malice).
115. See, e.g., Villella v. Waikem Motors Inc., 45 Ohio St. 3d 36, 43 (1989) (Brown, J., concurring);
Leitner, supra note 114, at 128.
116. Leitner, supra note 114, at 128-29.
117. Sales & Coles, supra note 53, at 1156-57 n.181 (listing several cases in which extremely large punitive
damage awards have been upheld on appeal).
118. Jeffries & Freeman, supra note 20, at 15.
119. Comment, supra note 79, at 142-44. See also, Eichenseer v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 894 F.2d 1414,
1418-22 (5th Cir. 1990) (Jones, J., dissenting).
120. Jeffries & Freeman, supra note 20, at 15.
121. Comment, supra note 79, at 143.
122. 455 US. 745, 763 (1982) (permanent neglect proceeding). See Comment, supra note 79, at 140-44.
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charging its duties more objectively. 123 Jury decisions will thereby be less sus-
ceptible to bias than before.12 4 These standards will also provide for more in-
volvement by the trial courts, who will have a better measure of whether or not
the jury decision is subject to passion or prejudice.125 The same is true of appel-
late courts, which would have more criteria with which to monitor and control
jury awards . 26 Additionally, detailed instructions will signal the jury members
that they must use caution and not act indiscriminately in exercising the power
of the jury. 27 Most important, increased scrutiny of jury awards, instead of
deference to excessive awards, will certainly reduce the uncertainty in punitive
damage cases.
Finally, the analysis must turn to the third prong of the "fundamental fair-
ness" test: the governmental interests at stake in maintaining the status quo. It
is critical to recall that the underlying purpose of punitive damages is to punish
and deter undesirable behavior. 28 It is therefore argued that this quasi-criminal
posture requires the types of protection afforded by criminal procedure. Follow-
ing that logic, if the government's interest is punishment, then to argue that it
should be allowed to punish without restraint is contrary to the basic principles
of the Constitution. Furthermore, vague standards for assessing punitive dam-
age awards actually defeat the governmental objective of deterring similar con-
duct in the future. 29 "An effective deterrent is based upon a clear and unequiv-
ocal threat. A threat has no impact or value as a deterrent unless the persons
against whom it is directed understand it.' 30 Since juries are given no stan-
dards, it is clear that potential defendants cannot know what conduct is consid-
ered sufficient to warrant severe punishment. Therefore, more suits follow, and
the cycle of growth discussed earlier' 3 ' continues to feed upon itself. Clearly,
the government lacks a compelling interest in maintaining the status quo.
It also has been argued that punitive damage awards protect consumer in-
terests, by preventing corporations from marketing dangerous goods, and the
government therefore has a duty to protect this defensive tool.'3 2 This theory,
however, collapses under the weight of the consumer cost discussed earlier. 133
"[T]he innocent consumer must pay higher prices for products and high risk
products, although they may be beneficial products, such as contraceptives and
pharmaceuticals, which may have to be withdrawn from the market.' 34 Thus,
it becomes clear that in order to protect consumers' interests properly, the gov-
123. Id. at 150-51. Compare Villella v. Waikem Motors Inc., 45 Ohio St. 3d 36, 43 (1989) (Brown, J.,
concurring) (recommending usage of more definite jury instructions proposed by the American College of Trial
Lawyers) with Y. REDDEN, supra note 50, at appendix A (collecting various state model jury instructions that
feature the vagueness criticized in this Note).
124. Comment, supra note 79, at 150-51. See also Wheeler, supra note 95, at 296-98.
125. Comment, supra note 79, at 150-51. See infra notes 138-42 and accompanying text.
126. Jeffries & Freeman, supra note 20, at 15.
127. Id., at 298. See infra notes 137-41 and accompanying text.
128. See supra note 99. See also Wheeler, supra note 95, at 333-38.
129. Leitner, supra note 114, at 128.
130. Id.
131. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
132. Comment, supra note 79, at 155.
133. See supra notes 79-85 and accompanying text.
134. Comment, supra note 79, at 155-56. See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
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ernment must insure that punitive damages are awarded judiciously and with-
out error.'" 5 Accordingly, the government has no interest in maintaining the
status quo under the guise of protecting consumers.
With the completion of the Mathews v. Eldridge "fundamental fairness"
test, it is clear that due process requires increased protections for defendants in
the punitive damages area. Nonetheless, the question remains as to what pre-
cisely should be done. The possibilities range from abolition of punitives alto-
gether to holding bifurcated trials where punitive damages are decided
separately. 3 6
This Note proposes two potential solutions. The first is to provide more
precise jury instructions. This approach will eliminate some of the arbitrary na-
ture of punitive damage awards. It also will constrain some of the unbridled
discretion that has disturbed both courts and commentators. The concurring
opinion of Justice Brown of the Ohio Supreme Court in the recent case of Vil-
lella v. Waikem Motors5 7 is illustrative of this approach. Justice Brown recom-
mends the adoption of the proposed model instruction of the American College
of Trial Lawyers.13  These instructions adopt a "clear and convincing" standard
of evidence in determining the reasonableness of a punitive award. 3 9 The model
further proposes relevant criteria to guide the jury in its deliberations. 1' 0 Most
importantly, the instruction admonishes the jury that "'[t]he purpose of puni-
tive damages is to punish and deter, not to vanquish or annihilate the defend-
ant.' "I" This statement alerts the jury to the ramifications of its ultimate deci-
sion and stresses the need for it to take great care in utilizing the weapon of
punitive damages. Although not entirely corrective, this process would be a
strong initial step towards controlling punitive damage awards.
135. Id. at 157.
136. See Jeffries & Freeman, supra note 20, at 11-16; Wheeler, supra note 95, at 294-303. Bifurcated trials
have been used with increasing frequency. See 1 KNAPP, COMMERCIAL DAMAGES 1 8.16; J. GHIARDI & J.
KIRCHER, supra note 56, at ch. 12; Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., 782 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1986).
137. 45 Ohio St. 3d 36, 43 (1989) (Brown, J., concurring).
138. Id. The American College of Trial Lawyers has taken a strong stance against punitive damages. See
AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LITIGATION ISSUES 27-36 (1986)
(finding the costs of punitive damages to outweigh the benefits and calling for severe limitations and controls on
jury awards); AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERs, REPORT ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES OF THE COMMITTEE ON
SPECIAL PROBLEMS IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JusTIcE (1989) [hereinafter REPORT ON PUNITIvE DAMAGES].
139. Villella, 45 Ohio St. 3d at 43. The "clear and convincing" evidence standard is in operation in a number
of jurisdictions today. In fact, it was used in Browning-Ferris, ably demonstrating that this step alone is insuffi-
cient to solve the problem. Other controls are also needed to achieve the consistency and fairness which the
proponents desire and the due process clause requires.
140. VIlella, 45 Ohio St. 3d at 43. The criteria provided in these instructions are:
(1) the nature of the defendant's conduct; (2) the impact of defendant's conduct on the plaintiff; (3) the
relationship between the plaintiff and defendant; (4) the likelihood that the defendant would repeat the
conduct if a punitive award is not made; (5) the defendant's financial condition; and (6) any other circum-
stances shown by the evidence, including any circumstances of mitigation, that bear on the question of the
size of any punitive award.
Id. (quoting REPORT ON PUNTrIVE DAMAGES, supra note 138).
141. Id. (quoting REPORT ON PUNITvE DAMAGES, supra note 138). This is in concert with the basic precepts
of the doctrine at common law. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
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A second possibility is the establishment of legislative limits on punitive
damage awards. 142 While this may seem to be an invasion of the province of the
jury, it is quite similar to the federal antitrust practice of trebling actual dam-
ages. 4 a That approach provides a substantial penalty for undesirable behavior,
while still allowing for a high degree of certainty in the sum to be exacted as a
penalty. If the basis of punitive damage awards is, in fact, punishment, then it
is essential that potential violators be given fair warning as to the consequences
of their actions. Furthermore, as a matter of public policy, such legislative ac-
tion will help prevent some of the harmful economic and social impact described
earlier.144
V. CONCLUSION
While it is always unwise to attempt to predict action that the Supreme
Court will take, it is this Author's opinion that the Court will be receptive to a
due process argument regarding excessive punitive damage awards. First, four
members of the Court expressly left this question open in Browning-FerrisY.45
Justice O'Connor, in fact, previously acknowledged the apparent due process
infirmities in this area in Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw,4' in which
she stated, "[a]s the Mississippi Supreme Court said, 'the determination of the
amount of punitive damages is a matter committed solely to the authority and
discretion of the jury.' . . . This grant of wholly standardless discretion to de-
termine the severity of punishment appears inconsistent with due process. '"1
Additionally, there is a growing recognition throughout the nation that the
current status of punitive damages is unacceptable. As one scholar has summa-
rized the situation, "[t]he unfortunate truth is that the evil of repetitive and
unconstrained punitive damages cannot be forestalled on such an ad hoc basis.
A realistic solution to this problem must be national in scope and therefore
federal in origin."' 4 8 This Author believes that the Court will be prepared to
answer this challenge when a proper case is presented.
Furthermore, it is also this Author's opinion that the due process argument
is compelling, especially in light of the important policy considerations discussed
142. Wheeler, supra note 95, at 298-300. The drafting of such legislative limits has proven to be extremely
difficult, as the tort reform packages of thirteen states have been found unconstituitional. Judge Rules on Tort
Reform, A.B.A. J., July 1990, at 31. The most recent example occurred in Georgia, where U.S. District Judge J.
Robert Elliott ruled that the state's limits, passed in 1987, were vagu and indefinite, and thus violated both the
equal protection and due process clauses. See McBride v. General Motors Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1563 (M.D. Ga.
1990).
143. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1987). See supra note 11.
144. See supra notes 72-93 and accompanying text.
145. Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 2909 (1989). This alignment was altered
before the Haslip case was argued in October. Justice Brennan, who retired on July 20, 1990, was the author of
the concurring opinion in Brownng-Ferrls that expressly left open the due process question for further considera-
tion. Justice Souter was not seated in time to hear oral argument in the case. See 59 U.S.L.W. 3307 (Oct. 23,
1990).
146. 486 U.S. 71 (1988).
147. Id. at 88 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
148. Jeffries, supra note 66, at 147.
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in Part III of this Note. The current method of awarding punitive damages is
destined to be altered.
Steven H. Sneiderman

